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Introduction
In the aftermath of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima in March 2011, nuclear policy has been reconsidered in Germany. Only shortly before, in December 2010, the amendment of the German nuclear law (Atomgesetz, 2010) was passed, including a possible prolongation of nuclear plant lifetimes up to 14 years compared to the nuclear phase-out decision in 2002 (Atomkonsens, 2002) . As an immediate reaction to the Fukushima catastrophe, the German government decided on a three-month moratorium which included the temporary shutdown of the seven oldest nuclear power plants and the nuclear plant Krümmel in order to re-evaluate the risks of nuclear power and the associated energy policy. Irrespective of a possibly changing nuclear policy, it was political will that ambitious climate protection targets, as defined in the coalition agreement between CDU/CSU (conservatives) and FDP (liberals) for the 17 th legislative period, should still be reached. Most importantly this agreement features the target of a 40% (80%) greenhouse gas emissions reduction until 2020 (2050) compared to 1990 as well as considerable energy efficiency improvements and a significant expansion of renewable energy sources. This paper presents an analysis of the effects of an accelerated nuclear phase-out on the electricity sector, based on a study commissioned by the German Ministry of Economics and Technology during the time of the nuclear moratorium. We use a detailed investment and dispatch model of European electricity markets and compute two scenarios in order to investigate the impact of a fast nuclear phase-out on electricity capacities, generation, import and export streams, electricity prices and costs, and CO 2 -emissions. Scenario A reflects German law before Fukushima, thus possible lifetimes up to the year 2036 for the newest nuclear plants. Prolongations of lifetimes in scenario A are only possible when significant retrofit investments are undertaken. In scenario B all nuclear plants that were shutdown during the moratorium are decommissioned permanently. The remaining nuclear plants have to be shutdown either between 2015 and 2020 (six plants) or before 2025 (three plants). Thus, scenario B corresponds to the political decision reached after the moratorium. In both scenarios, climate protection targets as defined in the coalition agreement are reached -albeit at slightly higher CO 2 -prices within the European emissions trading system. Our analysis extends the findings of Nagl et al. (2011) , showing how different possible pathways to a low-carbon German electricity system in 2050 under consideration of different nuclear phase-out times can be reached. Our analysis shows how these climate protection targets can still be reached under a fast nuclear phase-out and illuminates the corresponding consequences for the electricity sector, focussing on the timeframe until 2030. The analysis is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related literature. Section 3 describes the applied methodological approach, section 4 explains the most important technical and political assumptions. Scenario results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 draws conclusions.
Literature overview
A series of studies analyzing the effect of a fast nuclear phase-out have been published after the introduction of the moratorium. These studies can be distinguished by their time horizon (i.e. short term, long term), the applied analytical approach (i.e. model-based, quantitative, qualitative) and their focus on different aspects of the electricity sector. Matthes et al. (2011b) analyze security of supply as well as price effects in the aftermath of the moratorium screening empirical data on installed power plant capacities, planned installations, potentials of demand side management and historical time series of electricity and carbon emission prices. They show that prices for electricity and carbon emissions rose only slightly after the moratorium and that under certain assumptions security of supply can be guaranteed in a scenario with the last nuclear power plant being shut-down between 2015 and 2020. In a further paper, Matthes et al. (2011a) investigate electricity imports and exports in Germany after the moratorium in view of a public debate concerning possible "nuclear power imports from France". Using empirical data on peak demand, exports and imports and nuclear power plant utilisation in France as well as an analysis of the merit order in Germany, they conclude that additional imports to Germany after the moratorium are not caused by a shortage of capacity and do not come from nuclear power plants in France. Both studies mentioned use empirical data covering a short timeframe in spring after the introduction of the moratorium -e.g. price effects during winter days are not covered by the analysis. Also, possible effects of a phase-out in the mid and long term on installed capacity are not considered. Kunz et al. (2011) use a dispatch model which was calibrated to represent the network capacities in Central Europe in order to calculate the dispatch in three scenarios (Status quo, Moratorium, Phase-out) on a typical winter day. The analysis focuses on the short-term and does not take into account investment possibilities. The authors observe a rise in imports and a decline in exports combined with a rising electricity price in Germany in the moratorium and phase-out scenarios.
The German regulatory authority Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA, 2011) focuses on network capacity aspects of security of supply. Several scenarios have been analyzed (using different analytical approaches) based on different assumptions concerning electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E) and electricity demand. The analysis shows that a capacity problem may occur on winter days with little wind. The authors thus advocate network capacity extensions in order to cope with regional differences in demand and generation aggravated by a phase-out from nuclear power. r2b (2011) apply a model based analysis, covering the timeframe from 2012 to 2020, to calculate a status quo scenario (based on German law before Fukushima) and a phase-out scenario (all nuclear power plants have to be shut-down until 2017). Based on several assumptions concerning RES-E share, fuel prices and electricity demand they observe a decline in net exports and a significant rise in carbon emission and electricity prices in case of a nuclear phase-out. The qualitative effects of this study are in line with the other studies mentioned here, but the magnitude of the price effects is strikingly different (i.e. much more pronounced). Prognos (2011) analyse two scenario groups covering several moratorium and phase-out scenarios (varying in their shutdown schedule). In this analysis, which covers the timeframe until 2025, imports and exports are treated exogenously. The authors see a rise in electricity production from fossil driven power plants, in particular hard coal until 2020, as well as an increase in prices. They conclude that a phase-out is possible, but stress that investment stimulating incentives have to be investigated.
As we show in the following sections, the results of our analysis are generally in line with the abovementioned studies, in particular concerning the effects on imports and exports and the rising electricity and CO 2 prices. However, we do observe a different magnitude of the effects which results from differences in methodology and focus. Contrary to (a part of) the before-mentioned studies we model both dispatch and investment decisions, thus including short term effects and long term effects until 2030. In addition, within the nuclear prolongation scenario, we allow for endogenous (cost minimizing) prolongation decisions of each nuclear power plant in Germany based on plant specific retrofit costs. The quantity of nuclear capacity in our scenario representing German law before Fukushima thus varies from other studies, since not all possible nuclear lifetime extensions are realized in an overall cost-minimizing approach, due to high retrofit costs (see section 5). Moreover, by a combined analysis of all carbon emitting sectors our analysis shows that the ambitious carbon emission reduction targets as defined in the coalition agreement for the 17 th legislative period are reached in both scenarios. 1 Our analysis therefore describes a possible pathway to a low-carbon electricity system in Germany under an accelerated nuclear phase-out.
Methodical approach
Political intervention in electricity markets, like the one we analyze in this paper, may cause effects (e.g. increasing prices) that influence several sectors of an economy and may eventually feedback on electricity 1 For more details on this aspect see Schlesinger et al. (2011). markets (e.g. price elastic electricity demand). An analysis of the economic effects of an accelerated nuclear phase-out therefore requires a simultaneous analysis of all relevant sectors. Reasons are (short and longterm) price responsiveness of electricity consumers, differing CO 2 -abatement costs between the sectors as well as the efficient allocation of scarce input factors, such as biomass, between the sectors. 2
In our study, simulation models were used to analyze the effects in the specific sectors (Schlesinger et al. (2010) and Distekamp et al. (2004) ). For the computations of the electricity and cogeneration system, a long-term investment and dispatch model for the European electricity and combined heat markets (DIME) is used. 3 DIME is a dynamic optimization model that calculates the cost-minimal solution to meet electricity demand in Europe. It is applied to simulate an hourly dispatch of conventional power plants leading to investment decisions regarding the supply side of the electricity sector. The objective function minimizes total discounted system costs.
Input parameters can be divided into three groups: demand side parameters, supply side parameters and political parameters. The demand met by conventional generation is called residual demand, which essentially is given by total demand minus RES-E generation. The interdependencies between the electricity sector and the rest of the economy are taken into account using an iterative approach. In order to find a consistent solution for the electricity and cogeneration system, variables are iterated between the models to estimate sectoral electricity demands (Schlesinger et al., 2010) and the DIME model. In DIME the demand for electricity and (cogenerated) heat are used as input 2 For example, the transportation sector highly depends on liquid biomass if climate goals are to be achieved. 3 See Bartels (2009), for applications see e.g. Paulus and Borggrefe (2010) or Nagl et al. (2011) . 4 Electricity generation from waste and small-scale CHP technologies are also treated exogenously. 5 Marginal costs of electricity generation are estimated on the basis of the dual variables of the equilibrium conditions. parameters. DIME results including district and process heat generation, the German import and export balance of electricity, and electricity prices are in turn used to model sectoral demand developments. This approach accounts for the interdependency between electricity prices and demand.
Assumptions for the electricity sector
The analysis focuses on different nuclear phase-out policies in Germany. Through the comparison of two scenarios, we analyze the effects of an accelerated nuclear phase-out (scenario B) versus a prolongation of lifetimes for nuclear plants according to German law before the Fukushima catastrophe (scenario A). Significant retrofit investments are obligatory for nuclear power plants if the lifetime is to be extended.
These retrofit investment costs are specific to each power plant and vary between the two scenarios. Retrofit investment costs may hamper the profitability of certain plants and may hence lead to premature decommissions for economic reasons.
In more general terms, both scenarios are embedded in the energy policy framework as defined in the coalition agreement (between CDU, CSU and FDP) for the 17 th legislative period. Most importantly this agreement features the target of a 40% greenhouse gas emissions reduction until 2020 in comparison to the emissions in 1990. The agreement furthermore emphasises the need of energy efficiency improvements and states that renewable energies should be expanded continuously in order to play the predominant role in the future energy mix. Regarding conventional power plants, the usage of carbon capture and storage technologies is encouraged.
Electricity demand and potential for cogeneration
It is assumed that substantial energy efficiency improvements take place in Germany, leading to a decreasing gross electricity demand in the period regarded. The increasing electricity consumption due to the gradual diffusion of electric mobility is overcompensated by substantial energy efficiency investments of both 6 See Atomkonsens (2002) . 7 The prolongation times refer to applicable law (Atomkonsens, 2002) before the 2010 amendment to the Atomgesetz (Atomgesetz, 2010). households and industries. European (net) electricity demand is assumed to further increase in the short run and to reach a peak in 2020 (4% increase compared to 2008). After 2020 European (net) electricity demand is assumed to decrease (2% increase compared to 2008). A. This consequently leads to slightly higher CO 2 prices in the European ETS market (Table 2) . 
Development of RES-E in power generation
Due to the implemented feed-in-tariff system, RES-E capacities have been increased significantly in Germany in recent years. Since the introduction of the promotion system in 2000, the RES-E share of gross electricity consumption has increased from 6.4% to 16.8% in 2010. The development is mainly based on onshore wind turbines, additional biomass plants and especially in the last two years photovoltaics.
The further development highly depends on the design of the feed-in tariff system, technological innovation and the technical and economic potential. Table 5 shows the assumed RES-E capacities and the assumed generation by RES-E capacities until 2030. The strong increase of total generation by RES-E capacities (258 TWh in 2030) is mainly driven by additional wind turbines (on-and offshore), photovoltaics and biomass plants. Due to the limited potential of hydro plants in Germany only a small increase in generation is assumed.
Scenario results

Power plant fleet
Due to the mothballing of the seven oldest nuclear power plants and Krümmel (together 8.7 GW) in scenario B, total installed nuclear capacity in Germany is reduced to 12.7 GW in 2015 (Figure 1 ). Further decommissioning of nuclear power plants between 2015 and 2020 reduce installed nuclear capacity to 4.3 GW in 2020. Those remaining plants are mothballed before 2025. The reduced nuclear power generation in scenario B compared to scenario A is mainly compensated by three effects (Figure 5 ). Firstly, generation from existing fossil-fuel fired power stations increases. This effect is highlighted by the increased generation from hard coal-fired plants in scenario B compared to scenario A (2015: +25.6 TWh; 2020: +22.8 TWh; 2025: +19.9 TWh; 2030: +4.9 TWh). Secondly, as a consequence of the decommissioning of nuclear plants, additional conventional capacity is installed and utilised. This effect mainly occurs after 2020. In this period additional gas-fired capacities come online and are utilised as long as the clean spark spread (gross profit margin of gas-fired generation taking into account CO 2 costs) is favourable for these plants. Finally, European power trade is influenced. In 2015
Germany is a net electricity exporter in both scenarios. In contrast, Germany becomes a net importer in 2020 due to the fast nuclear phase-out while Germany remains a net exporter in scenario A. In the long run, Germany becomes a net importer of electricity in both scenarios, yet, net imports are higher in scenario B. These effects are a consequence of higher generation from coal and gas-fired plants in Germany due to the fast phase-out which raises marginal costs of generation and hence increases imports and decreases exports. Generally, the direction of international power flows is influenced by the fact that (by assumption) electricity demand is increasing in the rest of Europe while German electricity demand is decreasing. This development is paralleled by an expansion on the supply side. While there are significant fossil generation capacities currently under construction and coming online within the next few years (see Figure 3 above), the increase on the supply side is mainly due to RES-E capacity development which receives strong political support. Specifically, net imports are 9.9 TWh higher under a fast nuclear phase-out policy in 2015 (Table 6 ). This is mainly caused by a reduction of power exports from Germany to the Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland while imports increase by 2.7 TWh. In 2020 net imports are 26.3 TWh higher in scenario B. Most of the additional imports are provided by French and Czech generators. In the long run differences in net imports (2025: 20.6 TWh; 2030: 24.2 TWh) are mainly caused by additional imports coming from Poland and the Netherlands. The share of combined heat and power (CHP) generation increases in both scenarios. However, CHPheat generation is higher under a fast nuclear phase-out regime in comparison to a prolongation policy. This is due to the commissioning of gas-fired power plants with CHP-technology in response to capacity needs caused by the fast phase-out. These plants are utilised to compensate for the reduced nuclear power generation in scenario B and thus are able to efficiently serve heat demand in industry and district heating.
Costs of electricity generation and electricity prices
Comparison of scenario B (nuclear phase-out) to A (prolongation) shows that overall generation cost is increased by the phase-out. 9,10 Accumulating the additional generation costs of scenario B relative to scenario A until 2030, gives a sum of about 16.4 bn e 2008 . The present value of these costs using a discount rate of 3% (10%) amounts to 10.5 bn e 2008 (4 bn e 2008 ).
Taking a more detailed look at the different cost categories, we find that they follow opposing trends, as shown in Figure 6 . On the other hand, as a result of the nuclear phase-out in Germany we find an increase in variable generation costs including the costs associated with the cross-border electricity exchange (costs of additional electricity imports and foregone revenues of exports). This may be explained by the fact that nuclear power plants, which were decommissioned because of the moratorium, had to be replaced by generation capacities with higher variable costs, like gas-or coal-fueled power plants. Furthermore, this substitution leads to additional CO 2 -emissions in Germany, which in turn causes a rise of the CO 2 -price, thus increasing the variable costs of all fossil-fueled power plants. Overall, generation cost increasing effects (about 43.2 bn e 2008 ) exceed cost reductions, thus leading to additional generation costs in scenario B which amount to 16.4 bn e 2008 until 2030.
The phase-out of nuclear power plants leads to higher electricity prices for end-consumers. The impact depends on the consumer type. Table 7 shows the wholesale price, additional costs for renewable energies due to the feed-in tariff system and the resulting end-consumer prices including taxes and grid tariffs. Due to higher fuel and CO 2 costs, the wholesale electricity prices increase in both scenarios until 2030.
In the short and medium term (until 2030), the decreasing electricity demand, the development of RES-E capacities and the existing and currently-under-construction power plants lead to a comfortable capacity situation in Germany. This leads to a lower wholesale electricity price compared to 2010. In the long run, the wholesale electricity price covers the full costs of conventional power plants but not the costs of RES-E capacities.
The additional costs of RES-E are calculated by extrapolation of the current procedure of sharing these costs. Hence, the additional costs of RES-E sensitively depend on the development of the wholesale electricity price. Due to the strong RES-E expansion with generation costs that exceed wholesale prices, the additional costs increase until 2020. After 2020 the assumed investment costs of RES-E are significantly lower than today and the additional costs for RES-E decrease. The differences in additional costs for RES-E capacities between scenario A and B are due to the different wholesale prices.
The differences of electricity prices for end-consumers between years and scenarios mainly result from the differences in wholesale prices and additional RES-E costs. End-consumer prices increase until 2025/2030.
The electricity price for the electricity intensive industry highly depends on the wholesale electricity price because of exceptional rules considering taxes and additional RES-E costs. The faster phase-out of nuclear power in scenario A leads to a higher electricity price for the energy intensive industry. For the other consumer groups the lower wholesale prices are partly compensated by the burden of the additional costs for RES-E. Therefore the differences between the scenarios are considerably smaller. The burden of a faster phase-out of nuclear power for end-consumers can be determined by the additional expenses for electricity, i.e. the difference in electricity prices weighted by the electricity consumption. Figure 7 shows the accumulated financial burden for the different end-consumer groups in bn e 2008 until 2030. Due to higher electricity prices, the faster phase-out of nuclear power leads to an additional accumulated financial burden for all end-consumers of about 32 bn e 2008 until 2030 (not discounted). The net present value amounts to 27.8 bn e 2008 (3% discount rate) or 11.4 bn e 2008 (10% discount rate).
Concluding remarks
This paper presented a model-based analysis of two nuclear phase-out energy policy scenarios and their implications for the German electricity market. The analysis shows that the electricity generation sector can cope with an accelerated phase-out. New-built gas-fired capacities, lifetime extensions of existing installations and an increasing share of RES-E substitute the mothballed nuclear plants. Electricity imports increase and exports decrease while domestic generation from fossil-fuelled plants increases during the analysed period in the accelerated phase-out scenario.
Clearly, the analysis shows that an accelerated nuclear phase-out increases both costs and prices of electricity in Germany. Yet, additional costs in the power system are dampened in the case of an accelerated phase-out due to the avoidance of high retrofit costs in the prolongation scenario. Although prices increase for all consumer groups, price increases are more pronounced for industrial consumers than for households.
Increasing wholesale electricity prices decrease additional costs for RES-E support and thus partially absorb the price effect for non-industrial consumers. 11
However, the magnitude of the effects presented in this paper is driven by two very challenging political assumptions: Firstly, the realisation of a 36% RES-E share in 2020. Secondly, energy efficiency improvements and hence substantial electricity demand reductions.
Failure in either of the two will result in additional need for investments in conventional power plants in Germany, additional electricity imports (lower exports) and a higher utilisation rate of high-cost power plants. Generally, these drivers may increase prices, costs and greenhouse gas emissions in a given system.
Therefore, to organise the nuclear phase-out both economically and environmentally justifiable, structural transformations on the demand and the supply side are crucial.
